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Employee Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act
INTRODUCTION

Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a treble-damage remedy to
"any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 1 Although private
actions filed under this section play a major enforcement role in the
federal antitrust laws,2 lower courts have diverged widely in answering the threshold question of which parties have standing to maintain a section 4 action. 3 Even in the wake of two recent Supreme
Court decisions in this area,4 the law of antitrust standing remains
"something less than a seamless web." 5
This Note will focus on the confusion that plagues one category
of antitrust standing cases, those in which an employee alleges
wrongful discharge for his refusal to participate in a scheme that vioI. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(Supp. V 1981)). Section 4 provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the
district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
_cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The original version of§ 4 superseded § 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 210
(1890). Section 7 of the Sherman Act was repealed as redundant in 1955. Act of July 7, 1955,
ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283.
2. In fiscal 1980, 1,475 private antitrust actions were filed, compared to 78 government
cases (39 civil and 39 criminal) during the same period. The number of private filings is there•
fore about 19 times that of government filings. See Ao. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 1980 ANNUAL
REPORT 63, table 22. For almost two decades, the total number of antitrust suits has grown at a
rate of about 9% per year. Because the number of cases brought by federal agencies has re•
mained almost constant, however, this growth is almost wholly attributable to the increase in
the number ofprivate filings. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 533-34 (2d ed.
1981).
3. See cases cited in note 7 infra; see generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L. J. 809 (1977); Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots:
Complications and Co,iflicts on Standing to Sue and Causation Under Section 4 of the ClaJ·lon
Act, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 351 (1971); Lytle & Purdue,Anlitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act: JJeterminalion of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM.
U. L. REv. 795 (1976); Page,Anlitrusl JJamages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach lo Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 467 (1980); Sherman, Anll1rust Standing: From Loeb lo
Malamod, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374 (1976); Note, Standing to Sue for Treble JJamages Under
Section 4 ofthe Clayton Act, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 570 (1964); Comment, Standing Under Clayton§ 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 17 DICK. L. REv. 73 (1972).
4. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct.
897 (1983) (denying § 4 standing to labor union); Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465
(1982) (group health plan subscriber had standing to seek treble damages under § 4),
5. Warner Management Consultants, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 961 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) ("In fact, as we have had occasion to observe previously, this area of the law is rife
with 'doctrinal confusion.'") (citing In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393, 401
(N.D. Ill. 1979)).
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!ates the antitrust laws.6 Conflicts among the circuits in their analysis and resolution of these employee standing cases7 have not been
definitively settled by the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements
on the right to seek recovery under section 4. This Note argues that
these recent Supreme Court decisions, as well as the policies behind
the antitrust laws, weigh in favor of permitting an employee to maintain a section 4 action against his employer if he is discharged for
refusing to participate in an operation that violates the antitrust laws.
Part I of this Note discusses the general parameters of the right to
section 4 recovery, emphasizing the Supreme Court's recent formulation of these parameters. Part II suggests that when these antitrust
standing criteria are properly applied to the factual context in which
most employee standing cases arise, an employee discharged for refusing to participate in an antitrust scheme has standing to seek
treble damages under section 4.
I.

GENERAL PARAMETERS OF SECTION

4

RECOVERY

A. Purposes of and Requirements for Section 4 Recovery: An
Overview

In enacting section 4 of the Clayton Act, Congress created a private antitrust enforcement mechanism that employs two primary approaches. First, the potency of the treble-damage remedy seeks to
deter potential antitrust violators from pursuing unlawful schemes. 8
Second, where deterrence fails, the treble-damage remedy forces vio6. This Note will assume throughout that employee discharge or termination encompasses
the less frequent situation where an employee is not actually terminated by his employer but is
"forced" to resign. See notes 72-74 infra and accompanying text.
1. Compare Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded mem., 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983) (former marketing director who alleged forced resignation by employer and blacklisting by employer's co-conspirators because of his refusal to
cooperate with conspiracy had standing to seek § 4 recovery), and Shaw v. Russell Trucking
Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (truckdriver who alleged termination by employer
for his refusal to participate in antitrust conspiracy had § 4 standing), with Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983) (former corporate
president who alleged termination by employer and blacklisting by industrial gas industry for
his refusal to cooperate with conspiracy had no standing to seek § 4 recovery), McNulty v.
Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (unit sales manager who alleged discharge for
refusing to engage in activities that allegedly violated the antitrust laws had no § 4 standing),
Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (sales managers who alleged
discharge for active opposition to employer's allegedly discriminatory pricing policy had no
§ 4 standing), Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (employee
who alleged retaliatory dismissal for refusal to engage in allegedly anticompetitive practices
had no § 4 standing ), and Booth v. Radio Shack Div. Tandy Corp., 1982-83 Trade Cas.
~ 65,001 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (employee who alleged termination for refusing to carry out policies
that allegedly violated the Robinson-Patman Act had no § 4 standing).
8. See Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) ("the purposes of the antitrust laws are best
served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws"). See generally, Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 845-46 (citing supportive legislative history).
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lators to disgorge the fruits of their ill-gotten gains, while amply
compensating the victims of the antitrust violation. 9
The Supreme Court has emphasized these two main goals of section 4's private enforcement scheme - deterrence and compensation
- in determining who may recover treble damages under that section.10 In making this threshold determination, the Court has recognized two analytically distinct requirements for the existence of a
section 4 private right of action: 11 An antitrust plaintiff must allege
"antitrust injury" and he must also establish that he has "antitrust
standing." 12
The antitrust "injury" requirement is mandated by the language
of section 4 itself. Specifically, an antitrust plaintiff must allege injury to his "business or property" occasioned "by reason of anything
9. See Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) ("Congress sought to create a
private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of
their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations."); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 & n.10 (1976), See
generally Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 845-86 (citing supportive legislative history).
10. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465,473 (1982) ("[l]n the absence of some
articulable consideration of statutory policy suggesting a contrary conclusion in a particular
factual setting, we have applied § 4 in accordance with its plain language and its broad remedial and deterrent objectives."); American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 569 (1982) ("In this case, we can honor the statutory purpose [of the
antitrust laws] best by interpreting the antitrust private cause of action to be at least as broad
as a plaintiff's right to sue for analogous torts, absent indications that the antitrust laws are not
intended to reach so far.") (citations omitted); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343-44
(1979) (Because § 4 was primarily conceived as opening the door of justice to individuals and
giving ample damages to injured parties, the legislative history supports a holding that "a
consumer deprived of money by reason of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is injured in
'property'" within the meaning of that section.); cf. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 905-06 (1983) (although legislative history
supports broad construction of§ 4, a proper interpretation of this remedial provision cannot
"ignore the larger context in which the entire statute was debated"; this larger context reveals
the Congressional assumption that various co=on-law limitations would apply to antitrust
damages litigation).
Although the Court did not preface its analysis in Associated General with a recitation of
the broad remedial purposes of§ 4, the Court was nonetheless concerned with upholding that
section's private enforcement function. However, where this function could be performed by
an "identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate
the public interest in antitrust enforcement," the Court found little justification for allowing
"more remote" parties to assume the same private attorney-general role. 103 S. Ct. at 911. See
also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977).
11. See Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 473-77 (1982); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 728 n.7 (1977) ("[T]he question of which persons have been injured by an illegal
overcharge for purposes of§ 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which persons have
sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4.").
12. Although the analytical distinction between the two concepts has been explicitly recognized by the Court, see note 11 supra, the Court has not uniformly required discrete inquiries
with regard to antitrust standing and antitrust injury. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 904-13 (1983) (Court conducted single
inquiry as to whether party was "a person injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws
within the meaning of§ 4 of the Clayton Act."); Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 48184 (1982) (as part of antitrust "standing" analysis, Court incorporated clarified concept of antitrust "injury"); notes 16 & 47-67 infra and accompanying text.
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forbidden in the antitrust laws." 13 The "business or property" language underscores the fact that section 4 provides redress only for
pecuniary loss, 14 while the words ''by reason of' have been construed
as a restriction on the kinds of pecuniary losses that are cognizable
under section 4. 15 The Supreme Court has defined this universe of
cognizable antitrust injury to encompass only "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful." 16 The Court, in clarifying
13. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981); see note 1 supra. For § 4 purposes, "antitrust laws"
include the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976)), §§ 73-76 of the Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894), and the Act amending
the Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 40, 37 Stat. 667 (1913) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11
(1976)), and the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Excluded from
the meaning of the term "antitrust laws" for § 4 purposes are § 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Antidiscrimination Act, ch. 592, § 3, 49 Stat. 1526, 1528 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1976)) and§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). See Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958) (definition of antitrust laws contained at 15 U.S.C. § 12 is
exclusive for purposes of 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 & 26, permitting private actions for injuries resulting
from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws); cf. Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 194
F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ohio 1961) (a judgment or decree entered in connection with an antitrust
case filed by the government is not an "antitrust law" within the purview of§ 4 and a private
party may not recover for violation of such judgment or decree).
14. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1978) (construing injury to "business
or property" to encompass monetary injury to consumers arising directly out of retail
purchases); cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972) ("business or property"
refers to "co=ercial interests or enterprises" and not to "general damages" to state's
economy).
15. See generally Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 810-13; Page, supra note 3, at 497.
16. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (emphasis
added). In Brunswick, respondents, three bowling centers, complained that petitioner's acquisition of several financially troubled bowling centers violated§ 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), by lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly. In
seeking treble damages, however, respondents sought to prove that their profits would have
increased had petitioners allowed the acquired centers to close, thereby reducing competition
within the market. Thus, respondents sought to recover treble damages for injury suffered as a
result ofthepro-competitive effects of petitioner's acquisitions. The Court found that allowing
such recovery would have been "inimical to the purposes of [the antitrust] laws." Respondents
could not recover merely by showing that their loss occurred "by reason of' the unlawful
acquisitions; they had to show that their loss occurred " 'by reason of that which made the
acquisitions unlawful." 429 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added); cf. Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457
U.S. 465 (1982) (group health plan subscriber denied reimbursement for certain medical expenses had antitrust standing to challenge anti-competitive effect of refusal to reimburse).
In McCready, the Court adopted a two-pronged "test" for antitrust standing: The Court
looked to the "physical and economic nexus between the alleged [antitrust] violation and the
harm to the plaintifl'' and then to the "relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of
injury about which Congress was likely to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct
unlawful and in providing a private remedy under§ 4." 457 U.S. at 478. The second prong of
the Court's inquiry is merely an incorporation of the Brunswick test for antitrust injury within
the framework of antitrust standing analysis. See Case Note, Right to Sue Under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act - The Employee Dischargedfor Rejilsal to Participate in Anticompetitive Practices of his Employer, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 173, 198-99. Prior to McCready, Brunswick had
been interpreted by some courts to require that plaintiffs prove that their injuries resulted from
the anticompetitive effect of the alleged violation. See, e.g., Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681
F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). However, the Court announced in
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this definition, has interpreted the antitrust injury requirement to
stand for the proposition that treble-damage recoveries should be
linked both to the pro-competition policy behind the antitrust laws
in general1 7 and to the private enforcement goals of section 4 in particular.18 Where redress of the antitrust plaintiffs injury-in-fact
would not serve these goals, the Court may refuse to recognize the
injury as antitrust injury19 and may therefore deny the plaintiff
standing to maintain a section 4 action. 20
Mccready that Brunswick "is not so limiting." 457 U.S. at 482. Instead, the Court found it
sufficient that the plaintiff had charged defendants with a "purposefully anticompetitive
scheme" and had alleged pecuniary loss "as the consequence of [defendants'] attempt to pursue that scheme." 457 U.S. at 483 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); cf. Comment,
Employee Standing in Private Antitrust Suits: A New Element in the Balance, 51 U. CtN. L.
REv. 878, 883 n.41 (1982) (''That a Brunswick analysis should not be considered a limiting
factor in standing cases was recognized explicitly by the Supreme Court in Mccready.")
Moreover, the fact that Mccready was not the intended victim of the anticompetitive
scheme did not prevent her injury from being viewed as antitrust injury. Rather, because she
had not yielded to the coercive pressure of Blue Shield's selective reimbursement scheme, Mccready had borne directly what had been intended for the competitors of the conspirators. As
such, her injury "'flow[ed) from that which [made] defendants' acts unlawful' within the
meaning of Brunswick, and [fell] squarely within the area of congressional concern." 457 U.S.
at 484 (footnote omitted). McCready's role as a participant qua consumer in the relevant
economic market - the market for psychotherapeutic services - undoubtedly reinforced the
Court's assurance that McCready's injury fell within the core concerns that Congress had in
mind in enacting the antitrust laws. q: Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983) (distinguishingMcCreat& from case before Court,
in which plaintiff-union was neither consumer nor competitor in the relevant market, and had
failed to allege any marketwide restraint of trade).
17. Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 482 (1982); see note 16 supra.
18. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251 (1972). In Hawaii, the Court rejected the state of Hawaii's attempt to sue in its
parens patriae capacity for harm to its "general economy," caused by a conspiracy among
private defendants to restrain trade and commerce in petroleum products. 405 U.S. at 260-66.
The Court emphasized that "(e]ven the most lengthy and expensive trial could not, in the final
analysis, cope with the problems of double recovery inherent in allowing damages for harm
both to the economic interests of individuals and for the quasi-sovereign interests of the State."
405 U.S. at 264.
In Illinois Brick, the state of Illinois and 700 local governmental entities brought a trebledamage action for price overcharges paid as a consequence of an alleged price-fixing conspiracy among concrete block manufacturers. The Court held that only the overcharged direct
purchaser, not a "pass-on" customer, is "injured in his business or property" within the meaning of§ 4. 431 U.S. at 728-29; see also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392
U.S. 481 (1968); cf. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473-77 (1982) (characterizing the
antitrust injury requirement ofHawaii and Illinois Brick as a "duplicative recovery" limitation
analytically distinct from the "remoteness" or antitrust standing limitation on § 4 recovery).
19. In Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Court addressed the need for directness of
injury, particularly in avoiding apportionment of damages. According to the Court, the legislative purpose in creating a group of private attorneys general to enforce the antitrust laws is
better served by "holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the overcharge
paid by them than by attempting to apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part ofit." 431 U.S. at 746; cf. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 910-13 (1983) (same concerns expressed within general
analysis of right to seek recovery under § 4).
20. Although plaintiffs who have not suffered injury "by reason or• an antitrust violation
necessarily lack standing to maintain a§ 4 action, the converse is not true: Plaintiffs who have
suffered antitrust injury do not automatically have antitrust standing. See notes 21-24 iefra

August 1983]

Note-Employee Antitrust Standing

1851

The antitrust standing requirement further restricts the availability of a section 4 remedy, denying it to plaintiffs who may have suffered antitrust injury, but who are nevertheless deemed "too remote"
from the antitrust violation to seek treble damages. 21 Akin to "proximate cause" in the law of torts, the antitrust standing limitation establishes a point beyond which an antitrust violator is no longer
liable in treble damages for the antitrust injuries fl.owing from a particular violation.22
Unlike the antitrust injury requirement, the remoteness limitation on section 4 recovery, though derived in attenuated fashion
from section 4's "by reason of' language, is not mandated by the
statute.23 Rather, it originates in the lower courts' "virtually unanimous" conclusion that "Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to
and accompanying text. Because a plaintiff cannot maintain a § 4 action if either the antitrust
injury or the antitrust standing requirement is not met, the distinction between the two requirements disappears when one examines the effect of a denial of either.
21. In Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.
Ct. 897 (1983), the Court observed:
The label "antitrust standing" has traditionally been applied to some of the elements of
this inquiry. As co=entators have observed, the focus of the doctrine of "antitrust
standing" is somewhat different from that of standing as a constitutional doctrine. Harm
to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of
injury in fact, but the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiff is a
proper party to bring a private antitrust action.
103 S. Ct. at 907 n.31.
22. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.
Ct. 897, 907 (1983) ("There is a similarity between the struggle of co=on-law judges to articulate a precise definition of the concept of'proximate cause,' and the struggle offederaljudges
to articulate a precise test to determine whether a party injured by an antitrust violation may
recover treble damages.") (footnotes omitted). Because antitrust violations, like tortious acts,
may result in "virtually endless repercussions,'' a sense of fairness and proportionality led
courts to impose this limitation on§ 4 recovery. See Lytle & Purdue, supra note 3, at 796-802.
The need for some limitation on antitrust recovery emanates not only from the fact that a
single violation "may be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation's economy," but also from the potency of the remedy for antitrust injury that Congress fashioneda trebling of the actual damages incurred by a single antitrust violation. Because "[i]n the
absence of direct guidance from Congress, and faced with the claim that a particular injury is
too remote from the alleged violation to warrant § 4 standing, the courts are . . . forced to
resort to an analysis no less elusive than that employed traditionally by courts at co=on law
with respect to the matter of 'proximate cause,' " Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 477
(1982) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted), the Court has recently attempted to aid this analysis. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.
Ct. 897, 907 n.33 (1983) ("[C]ourts should analyze each situation in light of the factors set forth
in the text [of Associated General].").
23. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 810-11 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original):
(C]ourts have created an antitrust standing requirement by interpreting the phrase "by
reason of' to imply not only thefact of causation but also the presence of legal causation.
In § 4 case law this legal causation requirement, like the proximate cause requirement in
the law of torts, restricts the scope of a defendant's liability and a plaintiffs right to recovery_. . . . [I]ts precise definition[, however,] remains elusive because of the inherent ambiguity of the concept of legal causation.
Because the concept of antitrust standing is ambiguous, and because it derives from the
same statutory language as the antitrust injury requirement, notions of injury and standing are
easily confused. Basically, the traditional antitrust standing limitation means that courts do
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provide a remedy in damages for all [antitrust] injuries that might
conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation."24 And though consistent with the same pro-competition and private enforcement concerns underlying the Supreme Court's formulation of the antitrust
injury requirements, 25 the standing limitation is more solidly
grounded in the Court's desire to keep the private scheme manageable, thereby preserving its effectiveness.26
Ultimately, the analytical distinction between antitrust injury
and antitrust standing becomes blurred, but the difference between
the two concepts is not crucial for three reasons. First, the absence
of either antitrust injury or antitrust standing leads to the same result
- the antitrust plaintiff is denied the right to maintain a section 4
action. 27 Second, the underlying statutory policy concerns are identical in both inquiries, although the pro-competition goal may be less
prominent within the confines of traditional antitrust standing analysis. Third, although the analytical distinction between the two concepts has been recognized by the Supreme Court,28 recent decisions
indicate that the Court has turned to a single inquiry that incorporates the two concepts without explicitly differentiating them. 29
B. .Delimiting the Right to Section 4 Recovery

The Supreme Court has recently examined the limitations on section 4 recovery in two very different factual contexts.30 In so doing,
not accept the argument that Congress actually meant "any" person when it wrote the term
into§ 4.
24. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972) (emphasis added). The
Court has recently gone beyond mere acknowledgment of this implied limitation to express
approval of the lower courts' attempts to limit§ 4 recovery. See Associated Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 907 (1983); Blue Shield v, Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 477-78 (1982).
Standing under§ 4 is more carefully scrutinized than standing under§ 16 of the Clayton
Act, which provides for injunctive relief against ''threatened loss or damage by a violation of
the antitrust laws" whenever such relief would be granted by courts of equity. 15 U.S.C. § 26
(1976); see In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
25. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 38 & 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
27. See note 20supra.
28. See note 11 supra.
29. See note 12 supra and Part 1-B infra. Nevertheless, because the two concepts have
developed independently of each other, a separate jurisprudence exists with respect to each.
Specifically, the antitrust injury limitation has been shaped largely by the Supreme Court, see
notes l6-l9supra and accompanying text, while the antitrust standing limitation was originally
conceived by the lower federal courts, see notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text, and has
only recently become the focus of Supreme Court guidance. Thus, even under the Court's
recent unified approval of the right of § 4 recovery, an understanding of the analytical and
historical distinction between antitrust injury and antitrust standing is necessary to full comprehension of the Court's recent decisions in this area.
30. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S, Ct,
897 (1983) Qabor union sought § 4 recovery against multi-employer association, alleging that
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the Court has given the lower courts much needed guidance as to
when and how to apply these limitations. Part I-B of this Note will
analyze the Court's recent decisions and delineate the standing considerations which these decisions appear to lay down.
1. The Statutory Policy Considerations Behind the Limitations on
the Right to Seek Section 4 Recovery
In Blue Shield v. McCready 31 the Court held that a consumer of
psychotherapeutic services had standing to sue for the injury she sustained as a result of the defendants' conspiracy to restrain competition in the market for such services.32 In Mccready, the Court
"refused to engraft artificial limitations on the [section] 4 remedy," 33
and indicated that a plaintiff has standing to sue under section 4 unless statutory policy considerations suggest that allowing treble recovery would not properly serve the deterrence and compensation goals
of the antitrust laws.3 4
Examining the plaintiffs antitrust claim in McCready, the Court
identified the statutory policy considerations behind two distinct, judicially imposed limitations on the right to seek section 4 recovery. 35
the association had coerced third parties and its own members to do business with nonunion
firms, thus adversely affecting the trade of unionized firms, thereby restraining the union's
business activities); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (group health plan subscriber sought § 4 recovery against health insurer and organization of psychiatrists, alleging an
unlawful conspiracy to exclude psychologists from receiving compensation under health insurer's plans).
31. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
32. Respondent Mccready alleged that petitioners Blue Shield and a psychiatric society
had conspired to exclude clinical psychologists from participating in a prepaid health plan to
which she subscribed, in violation of§ I of the Sherman Act. Section I provides, in pertinent
part, that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). To further this conspiracy, Blue Shield allegedly denied
reimbursement for the services of psychologists unless the treatment was supervised by and
billed through a physician. When Mccready was denied reimbursement following unsupervised treatment by a clinical psychologist, she brought a treble damage action challenging the conspiracy. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that she had standing to
maintain the § 4 action. 457 U.S. at 484-85.
33. 457 U.S. at 472.
34. The Court found that "in the absence of some articulable consideration of statutory
policy suggesting a contrary conclusion in a particular factual setting, we have applied § 4 in
accordance with its plain language and its broad remedial and deterrent objectives." 457 U.S.
at 473 (emphasis added). To illustrate this point, the Court cited Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S.
308 (1978) (giving the statutory phrase "any person" its "naturally broad and inclusive meaning" by holding foreign sovereign to be a "person" for§ 4 purposes), and Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (giving "property" its "naturally broad and inclusive meaning" by
extending § 4 remedy to consumers injured by increase in purchase price of goods attributable
to price-fixing conspiracy).
35. The two limitations - the duplicative recovery limitation and the remoteness limitation - are judicially imposed rather than statutorily mandated. See notes 18-19 supra and
accompanying text (duplicative recovery limitation); notes 22-24supra and accompanying text
(antitrust standing limitation as a rough equivalent of remoteness limitation).
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First, the Court considered the "duplicative recovery" limitation.
When more than one injured party along a chain of distribution
claims damages arising from a single antitrust violation, there is naturally cause for concern that multiple plaintiffs might together seek
damages far in excess of what the statute would normally allow. 36
By recognizing as antitrust injury only the harm to those plaintiffs
who have been the most directly injured, the Court has sought to
avoid the potential consequences of allowing multiple section 4 actions. 37 These consequences - the necessity of complex damages apportionment and the splintering of treble-damage recoveries would burden both the courts and potential antitrust plaintiffs and
would thereby threaten the viability of the private enforcement
scheme.38 Because there was no risk of duplicative recovery in Mccready, however, the Court found that the private antitrust enforcement concerns behind the duplicative recovery limitation were not
implicated and declined to apply that limitation.39
The "remoteness" limitation, the second judicial control discussed inMcCready,40 is analogous to the traditional antitrust standing limitation.41 The Court emphasized careful application of the
36. See 457 U.S. at 474-75; notes 18-19 supra.
37. See notes 18-19 supra.
38. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.
Ct. 897, 912 (1983) ("[M]assive and complex damages litigation not only burdens the courts,
but also undermines the effectiveness of treble-damages suits."); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 737-38 (1977) (attempts to allocate a passed-on overcharge "would add whole
new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness"); cf. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968) (defendants not permitted to discount damages claims to the extent that overcharges had been passed
on to plaintiff's customers because such attempts to fix damages ''would often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated
theories").
39. 457 U.S. at 475. The Court found that permitting McCready to proceed offered "not
the slightest possibility of a duplicative exaction from petitioners." Because Mccready had
paid her bills, the Court reasoned, her psychologist could not "link any claim of injury to
himself arising from his treatment of Mccready." 457 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added). Worth
noting, however, is the possibility that McCready's psychologist could have linked a more
general claim of injury to himself arising from the Blue Shield plan. An action for injunctive
relief had in fact been brought by an organization of clinical psychologists and an individual
practitioner against the McCready petitioners and Blue Shield of Southwestern Virginia. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 469 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1979),revd.
in part, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). The Court of Appeals
found no conspiracy between the Blue Shield plans and the neuropsychiatric society, but it did
find that the plans themselves were "combinations of physicians" capable of conspiring within
the meaning of§ I of the Sherman Act. 624 F.2d at 479-81, 483. This treatment of the Blue
Shield plans as combinations rather than distinct entities was apparently accepted by the
Supreme Court in McCready. See 457 U.S. at 469 n.4.
40. See 457 U.S. at 476 ("Analytically distinct from the (duplicative recovery limitation],
there is the conceptually more difficult question 'of which persons have sustained injuries too
remote [from an antitrust violation] to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4.' ")
(quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 n.7 (1977)) (emphasis in original).
41. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
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policies underlying the antitrust laws, 42 finding it "reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially
affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover
threefold damages for the injury to his business or property."43 After focusing first on the "physical and economic" relationship between the alleged violation and the harm to the plainti.ff,44 and then
considering whether the harm to this individual was of the type
about which Congress was concemed,45 the Court in Mccready concluded that the plaintiff's claim satisfied both of these factors. 46 The
42. 457 U.S. at 477 (Although "neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of
§ 4 offers any focused guidance on the question of which injuries are too remote from the
violation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the predicate for a suit under§ 4[,] . . .
the potency of the remedy implies the need for some care in its application.") (emphasis
added).
43. 457 U.S. at 476-77 ("An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm to
flow through the Nation's economy; but 'despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point
beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.'") (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
44. 457 U.S. at 478-80. This "physical and economic" nexus requirement is most closely
analogous to the "directness of injury" factor of Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). See notes 66-67 infra and accompanying text.
45. 457 U.S. at 481-84. In general, the core concern of Congress in enacting the antitrust
laws was to enhance competitiou. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
320 (1962) (The core principles behind the enactment of§ 4, in particular, are deterrence and
compensation; the antitrust laws were enacted for ''the protection of competition, not competitors") (emphasis in original); notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
Thus, the Court's concern here is that standing to seek treble damages be linked to the procompetition policy behind the antitrust laws. But this interpretation blurs the analytical distinction between injury and standing because, as the Court recognized in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the very existence of antitrust injury turns on
whether the injury-in-fact resulting from an antitrust violation reflects the pro-competition
policy of the antitrust laws. See note 16 supra.
46. Because McCready was the direct victim of defendants' unlawful coercion, and because she suffered pecuniary loss as a result of her refusal to yield to that coercion, the Court
found that the requisite physical and economic nexus between the violation and the harm
existed. In applying the first prong of its remoteness analysis, the Court treated the physical
and economic nexus separately. Examining the physical nexus, the Court focused on two
elements. First, the specific intent of the conspirators, to impair psychologists' competitive
position within the psychotherapeutic market, was not dispositive. The availability of a § 4
remedy could not reasonably be restricted to the intended victims of the conspiracy, but would
extend to theforeseeable victims as well. 102 S. Ct. at 2548-49; cf. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 908 & n.37 (1983) (intent
allegation is not of controlling importance where plaintiff's attempt to show defendant's specific intent to harm them, or where defendant, as in Mccready, claims lack of specific intent to
harm plaintiff as a defense to plaintifrs antitrust claims). Second, because the denial of reimbursement to McCready was the "very means" by which Blue Shield allegedly sought to
achieve its illegal ends, the harm to McCready and her class was "clearly foreseeable,'' and
precisely the type of harm that the underlying conspiracy would be likely to cause. 457 U.S. at
479 (citations omitted).
Looking to the economic nexus, the Court simply stated that as a consumer of psychotherapy services and a subscriber to the Blue Shield plan, Mccready was clearly " 'Within that area
of the economy . . . endangered by [that] breakdown of competitive conditions' resulting from
Blue Shield's selective refusal to reimburse.'' 457 U.S. at 480-81 (quoting In re Multidistrict
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Court therefore held that McCready had standing to maintain a section 4 action.
2. Explicit Identification of Factors Relevant to the Right to Seek
Section 4 Recovery
In Associated General Contractors of Cal!fornia v. Cal!fornia State
Council of Carpenters ,47 the Court collapsed the antitrust injury and

antitrust standing requirements, explicitly identifying factors that are
relevant to a unified judicial inquiry into a plaintiff's right to seek
section 4 recovery. At issue was an employee union's standing to
bring an antitrust action seeking section 4 recovery. 48 The Court
found that the Union was not "a person injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws within the meaning of [section] 4 of the
Clayton Act." 49
In examining the question of standing, Associated General modified Mccready by de-emphasizing the facially broad language of
section 4. so The Court focused instead on the circumstances surrounding the enactment of section 4's statutory predecessor, section 7
of the Sherman Act. 51 The Court found the Sherman Act's legislaVehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31,481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045
(1973)).
As to the second prong of the remoteness analysis, the Court reasoned that because Mccready was a consumer of the services that were the target of the alleged conspiracy, her injury
was clearly within the core of congressional concern in enacting the antitrust laws. The Court,
then, found it sufficient that the plaintiff had charged the defendant with a "purposefully an•
ticompelitive scheme" and had alleged pecuniary loss "as the consequence of (dqendant!r) attempt to pursue that scheme." 457 U.S. at 483 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
47. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
48. Plaintiff alleged that the multi-employer association with which it had a collective bargaining agreement had coerced certain third parties to give some - but not necessarily all of their business to nonunion firms. 103 S. Ct. at 903. Only this last allegation was an antitrust
allegation. The two classes of coerced persons encompassed by this antitrust claim were: (I)
landowners and others who "let" construction contracts; and (2) general contractors. Included
in the first class were defendants' customers and potential customers, while the second class
consisted of defendants' competitors and defendants themselves. The Union alleged that defendants' coercive conduct weakened and restrained the trade of certain contractors who refused to submit to defendants' pressure tactics and at the same time caused certain unionized
subcontractors to lose business from the contractors who did submit to defendants' coercion.
103 S. Ct. at 903.
The Union claimed that as a result of this alleged restraint on the market for construction
contracting and subcontracting, it suffered injury to its "organizational and representational
activities." 103 S. Ct. at 902. Yet the Union did not allege any restraint on competition in the
market for labor union services. 103 S. Ct. at 903 n.14 (distinguishing cases where union organizational and representational activities were held to constitute a form of business protected
by the antitrust laws because those cases involved claims that competition between rival unions had been injured).
49. 103 S. Ct. at 913.
50. See 103 S. Ct. at 904 & n.I 9; note 34 supra.
51. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209,210 (1890), repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch.
283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283.
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tive history to be filled with "repeated references to the common
law[,] ... mak[ing] it clear that Congress intended the [Sherman]
Act to be construed in the light of its common-law background." 52
That background encompassed well-accepted rules circumscribing
the availability of damages recovery in tort law. 53 This common
law history thus becomes an "articulable consideration of statutory
policy" 54 to be added to those the Court already enumerated in McCready as limiting section 4 recovery. As a result, allegations of
consequential harm, even when supported by an allegation of intent
to harm the plaintiff, do not end the inquiry into the availability of a
section 4 right of recovery. 55 Instead, courts must consider three additional factors analogous to pertinent common law considerations: 56
(1) the nature of the plaintiffs alleged injury; 57 (2) the nature of the
damages claim;58 and (3) the directness or indirectness of the plaintiffs injury.59
In considering the first factor, the nature of the plaintiffs injury,
the Court apparently incorporated the antitrust injury requirement
within its standing analysis.60 Thus, the Court noted that the "central interest" of the Sherman Act was to protect the "economic freedom of participants in the relevant market." 61 Consumers or
competitors of the relevant product or service fall most clearly within
the ambit of this interest.62
Focusing on the nature of the damages claim, the Court in Associated General concerned itself with whatMcCready had labelled the
52. 103 S. Ct. at 905 (Although the legislative history supports a broad construction of§ 4's
antecedent, "[a] proper interpretation of the section cannot . . . ignore the larger context in
which the entire statute was debated.") (emphasis added).
53. The Court's examples of these judge-made rules included the doctrines of (I) foreseeability and proximate cause; (2) directness of injury; (3) certainty of damages; and (4) privity of
contract. 103 S. Ct. at 905-06. The Court specifically added the second and third of these
doctrines to its antitrust framework. See notes 58-67 infra and accompanying text.
54. Mccready, 451 U.S. at 473; see notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
55. Associated General, 103 S. Ct. at 908.
56. 103 S. Ct. at 907 ("[A]s was required in common-law damages litigation in 1890, the
question [whether the Union may recover for injury allegedly suffered by reason of the defendants' actions] requires us to evaluate the plaintifi's harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them.") (footnote omitted).
57. 103 S. Ct. at 908.
58. 103 S. Ct. at 911.
59. 103 S. Ct. at 910.
60. See notes 16 & 45 supra and accompanying text.
61. 103 S. Ct. at 909 (citingMcCready as precedent for the relevance of this central interest
in determining the plaintiff's standing to maintain a § 4 action).
62. 103 S. Ct. at 909. Because the Union in Associated General was neither a consumer nor
a competitor, and because the Union's longstanding collective bargaining relationship with
defendants meant that labor market interests dominated the antitrust implications of defendants' conduct, the Court did not consider the injury to the Union to be an antitrust injury.
103 S. Ct. at 909-10.
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"duplicative recovery" limitation; 63 the Court simply expressed the
additional requirement that damages claims not be speculative,
thereby raising what was a footnote inMcCready to textual status. 64
The "statutory policy concern" here is that the effectiveness of the
private enforcement scheme would be crushed under its own weight
if the Court were to allow complicated and speculative damage theories to stand. 65
The Court's inquiry into the third factor, the directness of the
injury, also reflects its concern for the effectiveness of private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Associated General indicates that
standing inquiries ought to concentrate on whether a more directly
injured, identifiable class of putative antitrust plaintiffs exists. 66 If
such a class of persons ''whose self-interest would normally motivate
them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement" does
exist, the justification for allowing a more remotely injured party to
perform the role of private attorney general is greatly diminished. 67
Applying all three factors to the facts of Associated General, the
Court concluded that the Union did not have standing to seek section 4 recovery. 68 The question remains whether Associated Gen63. This is basically an antitrust injury inquiry.
64. The Court noted in Associated General that "nothing but speculation informs the
Union's claim of injury by reason of the alleged unlawful coercion. Yet, as we have recently
reiterated, it is appropriate for § 4 purposes 'to consider whether a claim rests at bottom on
some abstract conception or speculative measure of harm.'" 103 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting McCrea,&, 451 U.S. at 475 n.Il);seealso Case Note,supra note 16, at 183-84, 194-95 (treating the
feasibility of implementing certain damage theories as a third prong of the Mccready
analysis).
65. The Court emphasized the "strong interest ... in keeping the scope of complex anti•
trust trials within judicially manageable limits." 103 S. Ct. at 911 (footnote omitted). This
interest underlies "the importance of avoiding either the risk of duplicate recoveries on the one
hand, or the danger of complex apportionment of damages on the other." 103 S. Ct. at 912; see
notes 18 & 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 911.
67. 103 S. Ct. at 911. This third factor is analogous to traditional antitrust standing analysis, and to the "remoteness" inquiry in McCrea,&. See 451 U.S. at 476-84. Where such a
directly injured class exists, denying the more remote party a remedy "is not likely to leave a
significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied." Associated General, 103 S. Ct. at
911; see also notes 18-19 supra.
68. Applying the second and third factors to Associated General itself, the Court first found
that the Union's injury was merely derivative. The Court noted:
If the Union claims that dues payments were adversely affected because employees
had less incentive to join the Union in light of expanding nonunion job opportunities, its
damage is more remote than the harm allegedly suffered by unionized subcontractors.
The same is true if the Union contends that revenues from dues payments declined because its members lost jobs or wages because their unionized employers lost business.
That harm, moreover, is even more indirect than the already indirect injury to its members, yet a number of decisions have denied standing to employees with merely derivative
injuries.
103 S. Ct. at 910 n.46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). There was, indeed, "no allegation
that the Union's revenues in the form of dues or initiation fees" had decreased. 103 S. Ct. at
911. Rather, any injury to the Union was "only an indirect result" of whatever harm may have
been suffered by certain contractors and subcontractors - by those who refused to yield to the
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eral's three-factor approach allows a discharged employee to
maintain a section 4 cause of action.

II.

THE DISCHARGED EMPLOYEE'S STANDING TO SEEK
RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 4

Together, McCready and Associated General demonstrate the
Court's desire to go beyond labels in the antitrust context, and to
examine instead the policy considerations that affect antitrust standing. After describing the context in which ·employee standing cases
arise, Part II of this Note argues that the factual context and policy
concerns peculiar to these cases weigh heavily in favor of granting
antitrust standing to discharged employees.
A. Employee Standing: The Factual Context

The very context of employee standing requires explanation, because employees will attempt to maintain section 4 actions in varying capacities. For example, employees may allege derivative injury
flowing from a business weakened by an anticompetitive scheme.69
They may also allege more direct injury resulting from a concerted
refusal to deal aimed directly at them and at the employment market
of which they are a part.70 Generally, employees are denied antitrust
standing in the former case,7 1 and granted it in the latter.72
defendants' coercive practices and who thereby lost business to nonunion firms, and by those
union firms that lost business when contractors or subcontractors yielded to defendants' coercive practice by diverting contracts to nonunion firms. 103 S. Ct. at 910 & n.46. Because the
more immediate victims of the defendants' coercion would be able to maintain a treble damage action against defendants, 103 S. Ct. at 911, and because of the speculative and duplicative
nature of the Union's damages claim, the Court concluded that the second and third factors of
its analysis, together with the nature of the Union's injury, ''weigh[ed] heavily against judicial
enforcement of the Union's antitrust claim." 103 S. Ct. at 913.
69. The primary injury in these cases is felt by the employer, in the form of lost business
resulting from the anticompetitive effects of an antitrust violation. When the employer reacts
to this loss by terminating employees, or when employees receive diminished salary or commissions as a result of the employer's weakened market position, these employees suffer derivative injury only.
70. The Supreme Court has long permitted those targeted by such a concerted refusal to
deal to challenge the larger conspiracy of which the restraint on competition in the labor market is but a part. For example, in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957),
the plaintiff football player alleged that pursuant to a conspiracy among the defendants to
monopolize professional football in the United States, he had been boycotted and blacklisted
for having played for a professional football league that competed with the defendant's league.
The Court allowed the plaintiff to challenge the primary conspiracy to monopolize professional football of which the employee boycott was a part.
. '
·
71. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 938 (1973) (employee lacked antitrust standing to seek recovery for termination resulting
from employer's illegal merger); Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Okla.
1971) (same); Bywater v. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas. ,i 73,759 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (employees and their union had no standing to seek§ 4 recovery where employer was
directly affected by Japanese television manufacturers' conspiracy to undersell American
competitors).
72. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional
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In the category of employee standing cases with which this Note
is concerned, the employee lies somewhere between these two extremes.73 The paradigm of the aggrieved employee with which this
Note deals is the whistleblower - the employee who refuses to cooperate with his employer's antitrust violating scheme, often in a not
so quiet way, and who therefore suffers the consequence of
termination.
The violative schemes in these cases are usually horizontal conspiracies among a group of similarly situated employers to fix prices,
rig bids, or allocate markets.74 Often, the noncooperating employee
occupies an at-will sales or managerial position that renders his active participation in any such horizontal conspiracy essential to its
success.75 An examination of the elements of standing set forth in
Associated General indicates that an employee in this situation has
standing to seek treble damages under section 4.
B. Assessing the Statutory Policy Considerations

I. The Nature of the Employee's Injury

Employees who are discharged for refusing to carry out their employer's antitrust violating scheme suffer pecuniary loss76 as a direct
football player had standing to challenge blacklisting by defendant league); Quinonez v. National Assn. of Sec. Dealers 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff securities sales representa•
tive who was the victim of defendant's blackball exclusionary practices had standing to sue);
Nichols v. Spencer Intl. Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967) (former employee of defendant had standing to challenge "no switching" agreement entered into between defendant and
other firm in industry); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (former
division managerial employee had standing to sue for loss of employment opportunity, where
there was agreement between buyer and seller of corporate division that seller would not rehire former managerial employees who refused employment with buyer); Drysdale v. Florida
Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (tennis player had standing to sue for
injuries resulting from defendant's restrictive draft system); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (employee had standing to sue where he alleged that
former employers had conspired to prevent his employment in oil well surveying industry and
had power to enforce conspiratorial decision).
73. That is, the employee is not alleging mere derivative injury, nor is he necessarily alleging a concerted refusal to deal aimed at restricting competition in the employment market.
74. See cases cited at note 7 supra. Horizontal conspiracies violate § I of the Sherman Act.
See note 25 supra.
75. See, e.g., Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1261 (1983) (corporate president); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated and remanded mem., 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983) (market director); McNulty v. Bor•
den, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (unit sales manager); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co.,
541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (sales managers). But see Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line,
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (truckdriver). In fact, an employee's mere noncooperation may seem threatening to the employer, for his refusal to participate leaves him with clean
hands, and his knowledge of the conspiracy gives him ample weaponry with which to attack
the employer ifhe becomes disgruntled or ifhe is terminated -whether for antitrust related
reasons or for reasons unrelated to the purposes of the antitrust laws.
76. See, e.g., Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1976)
("There can be little doubt that an employee who is deprived of a work opportunity has been
injured in his 'commercial interests or enterprise,' because the selling of one's labor is a com-
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consequence of their refusal to cooperate with the unlawful action.
Whether this pecuniary loss is cognizable under section 4 depends on
the characterization of the employee's role in the relevant market.77
Although an employee, like the Union in Associated General, is
neither a consumer nor a competitor with respect to targeted goods
or services, an employee resembles a consumer because he participates in the relevant market insofar as his cooperation or noncooperation with an illegal scheme affects that market. By cooperating with
such a plan, an employee helps to effectuate a restraint on the market
for his employer's goods; by refusing to cooperate, however, the
same employee can thwart the scheme.78 Furthermore, to the extent
that the employee alleges a post-discharge boycott of his services
among all the employer-conspirators, the boycott affects the market
for an employee's services .79 The shunned employee is a crucial participant in this market and is clearly injured by a boycott. 80
The central concern of the antitrust laws - protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant market - may well
extend to protecting the entrepreneurial freedom of some employees.
Discharged employees whose jobs involve the exercise of economic
discretion and who rely on the ability to compete in an unfettered
market suffer a distinct injury of the type contemplated by the
Supreme Court. Unlike the Union's interest inAssociated General, 81
the typical employee's interests are clearly disserved by diminished
competition. Because sales and managerial employees often depend
on commissions and bonuses to supplement their salaries, and because the size of commissions or bonuses could be reduced by a
mercial interest."); Nichols v. Spencer Intl. Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967) (loss
of employment as sales supervisor) ("(W]e readily conclude that one who has been damaged
by loss of employment as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws is 'injured in his business
or property' and thus entitled to recovery under [§ 4 of Clayton Act] . . . [since] the interest
invaded by a wrongful act resulting in loss of employment is so closely akin to the interest
invaded by impairment of one's business as to be indistinguishable in this context."); accord
Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1967) (termination of employment as sales supervisor); Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d
Cir. 1948) (loss of employment as advertising solicitor); Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F.
Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (termination of employment as territory sales manager and
concomitant loss of commissions and bonuses); Kinzler v. New York Stock Exch., 62 F.R.D.
196, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (loss of accounts resulting from freeze on employment of failing
broker's registered representatives is injury to business or property within meaning of § 4);
Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Assn., 344 F. Supp. ll8, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(salary or commissions lost as a result of antitrust violations recoverable as damages).
11. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
18. See note 97 i'!(ra (noncooperative employee serves as prime government source in
criminal antitrust prosecution).
79. q. Associated General, 103 S. Ct. at 903 n.14 (dictum implying that Union might have
had § 4 claim if it had alleged direct restraint in the market for labor union services).
80. See notes 70 & 72 supra.
81. See Associated General, 103 S. Ct. at 909 ("It is not clear whether the Union's interests
would be served or disserved by enhanced competition in the market.").
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rigged market, these employees have a direct interest in protecting
that market's integrity. Moreover, because at-will employees are not
covered by a separate body of federal labor law, 82 the employees'
antitrust concerns predominate, and allowing employees to air these
concerns in a judicial forum is consistent with the pro-competitive
thrust of the antitrust laws.83
2. The Nature of the Damages Claim
Neither the "duplicative recovery" nor the "speculative damages" concerns discussed in Associated General are warranted in the
employee discharge context. First, the duplicative recovery problem
does not arise because the employee suffers a discrete injury that is
easily distinguishable from any harm suffered by consumers or competitors in the relevant market. Because the claims of consumers,
competitors, and employees would not intermingle, there would be
no need to apportion damages. 84
Second, the discharged employee's damages claim is not the least
bit speculative. 85 The employee's injury is direct, its nature precise.
82. See Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust JJischarge: The Needfor a Federal
Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319, 319 n.4 (1983) ("The United States stands almost alone
among democratic industrialized nations in not providing legal protection against unjust discharge for all wage-earning and salaried employees."). As a result, "(s]ome fifty-nine million
private sector employees remain unprotected against arbitrary and possibly unfair disciplinary
penalties, including discharge, that may be imposed unilaterally by employers for unaccept•
able behavior." Id. at 322.
At-will employees must usually content themselves with whatever state tort remedies are
available. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal,
Rptr. 839 (1980) (employee who alleged that he was discharged for refusing to participate in an
illegal price fixing scheme was allowed to bring a wrongful discharge tort action against his
employer). State remedies are, however, inadequate for two reasons. First, most states continue to recognize the employment-at-will doctrine, which holds that an oral contract under
which an employee offers only his labor as consideration is terminable at, the will of either
party. As a result, state remedies generally do not protect employees against arbitrary discharge. See Stieber & Murray, supra, at 321-22 & n.23; Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower
from Retaliatory IJischarge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277, 280 (1983) ("In jurisdictions strictly
adhering to the employment-at-will doctrine, the discharged whistleblower has no remedy.")
(footnote omitted). Second, "[e]ffective enforcement of federal antitrust laws cannot be made
to depend upon the availability of alternate remedies under varying local laws." Ostrofe v.
H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1384 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded mem., 103 S.
Ct 1244 (1983). Section 4 demands a more reliable way to deter conspiring employers, as well
as a more certain remedy for wrongfully discharged employees.
83. The employee's complaint thus comes within the Brunswick test for antitrust injury.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
84. Because employees are not within the same chain of distribution as either the competitors of the conspirators, or the consumers of the targeted goods or services, the duplicative
recovery concern is absent in the employee discharge context. See Case Note, supra note 16, at
193-94.
85. q: McCready Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982):
If there is a subordinate theme to our opinions in Hawaii and Illinois Brick, it is that the
feasibility and consequences of implementing particular damages theories may, in certain
limited circumstances, be considered in determining who is entitled to prosecute an action
brought under § 4. Where consistent with the broader remedial purposes of the antitrust
laws, we have sought to avoid burdening § 4 actions with damages issues giving rise to the
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Courts are thoroughly familiar with wrongful termination actions;
damages awards are neither difficult to ascertain86 nor frighteningly
large. 87 Finally, unlike the situation in Associated General, the employee discharge situation does not implicate a competing body of
substantive law that could dominate the antitrust concerns raised by
the employer's antitrust violating behavior. 88
need for "massive evidence and complicated theories," where the consequences would be
to discourage vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws by private suits.
457 U.S. at 475 n.11 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
493 (1968)).
86. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded mem., 103 S. Ct 1244 (1983) ("Suits for damages by persons wrongfully discharged
are common; courts are accustomed to assessing such damages; they are neither unduly speculative nor difficult to calculate . . • ."). Thus, an employee's claim, ''while perhaps not ascertainable to the penny, as was McCready's claim, certainly involve[s) none of the 'massive
evidence and complicated theories' required in typical antitrust actions." Case Note, supra
note 16, at 195 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 475 n.11).
87. Courts are wary of the possible anticompetitive effects of imposing treble-damage liability because extremely high damage awards can severely injure a defendant. See Note, Class
Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MrcH.. L. R.E.v. -, - - - (1983) (bankruptcy caused by
punitive damage awards). Courts will not want to bury an individual defendant with antitrust
damages where the loss of that defendant would appreciably lessen competition within the
affected market Yet treble-damage awards to discharged employees are unlikely to produce
the level of damages that might be generated in a McCready class-action setting. See Case
Note, supra note 16, at 194 ("Given [the employee's) relatively small potential recovery, lost
wages and bonuses trebled, it is unlikely that such a recovery would ruin" the employer or the
employer's co-conspirators.). Concern about removing a defendant from the market, thus producing a concomitant reduction of competition in the affected industry, is largely absent in the
employee discharge situation.
For an excellent discussion of the policy against overkill liability, see Berger & Bernstein,
supra note 3, at 851-52, 868. Berger and Bernstein explain that the policy against ruinous
recoveries comes into play when "discrete injuries are so numerous that nonduplicative treble
damages recoveries for all of them would heavily burden, or perhaps even bankrupt, one or
more defendants." Id. at 851 (emphasis added). The concern is with the total impact of these
discrete awards, and is justified only where it accords with the substantive principles of the
antitrust laws. Where no anticompetitive effects are likely, however, "concern over the extent
of an antitrust defendant's total liability represents no more than unwarranted solicitude for
the alleged antitrust violator." Id. at 852. The authors caution that "an overkill defense cannot be permitted to prevail in antitrust standing decisions when great market power causes
numerous simultaneous injuries, lest a defendant be effectively shielded from liability because
of the outrageous scope of his own misconduct." Such a result, they maintain, would contradict both the deterrent and remedial objectives of the antitrust laws. Id. at 868; see also Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1979) (fear that standing will have potentially ruinous effects on small businesses is not an unimportant consideration, but is one more properly
addressed by Congress than by the judiciary).
88. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct.
897, 909-10 (1983). Because of the existence of a broad labor exemption from the antitrust
laws and a separate body of labor law specifically designed to protect and promote the "organizational and representational activities of labor unions," the Court in Associated General
noted that "a union, in its capacity as bargaining representative, will frequently not be part of
the class the Sherman Act was designed to protect, especially in disputes with employers with
whom it bargains." 103 S. Ct. at 910 (emphasis added);see also notes 53-54supra. In contrast,
most individual employees are not protected by a separate body of law. See note 82supra and
accompanying text.
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3. The .Directness of the Employee's Injury
In addition to the nature of the employee's injury, courts must
examine the directness of that injury. The situation examined in this
Note involves direct coercion by an employer attempting to control
individual behavior. An employee's refusal to succumb to this coercion usually leads to retaliatory discharge, 89 and he suffers pecuniary
injury as a result. 90 To be sure, the employee is not the intended target of the antitrust conspiracy;91 he is merely an instrument used to
carry out the conspiracy. Only when he declines this assigned role is
the employee subjected to whatever economic sanctions his employer may wish to visit upon him.
In all these particulars the employee is akin to the uncooperative
contracting and subcontracting firms in Associated General. Those
firms also refused to yield to the defendants' coercive practices and
were therefore subjected to the defendants' retaliatory economic
sanctions.92 The Court declared in that case that such firms could
maintain section 4 actions against the defendants, because they were
both participants in the relevant market and the direct victims of the
defendants' coercive practices.93 The discharged employee appears
to fall within this dictum as well.
Behind this rather mechanistic application ofAssociated General,
however, lie even stronger reasons to find that employees are directly
injured persons within the meaning of that case. First, discharged
employees are a directly injured, identifiable class of persons whose
self-interest could easily motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement.94 Granting a section 4 right of action to
these employees would give them a powerful incentive to refuse participation in unlawful schemes. Knowledge of this incentive, and
fear of the treble-damage consequences of terminating recalcitrant
employees, might deter employers from even pursuing conspiracies
that require the knowledge and participation of several employees. 95
89. Retaliatory discharge may be preceded by a variety of less drastic coercive measures
that are intended to preserve the conspiracy by forcing the employee to capitulate. See, e.g.,
Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (plaintiffs alleged reduced
compensation, inability to add new customers, reduction in potential for advancement, diminution of professional reputation and integrity, and ultimate loss of jobs).
90. See note 76supra.
91. q: notes 16 & 46 supra.
92. See note 58 supra.
93. See notes 46 & 68 supra and accompanying text.
94. See Case Note, supra note 16, at 192; note 97 infra and accompanying text; cf. note 67
supra and accompanying text.
95. An uncooperative employee leaves the employer with few options. The employer can
(I) discharge the employee and run the risk of a § 4 action; (2) allow the employee to interfere
with the conspiracy, thus reducing its effectiveness; (3) buy the employee's acquiescence, assuming that the employee has few principles; (4) abandon the illegal practice. See Case Note,
supra note 16, at 192. Unless the employer has reason to believe that an employee can main-
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Second, if the treble-damage remedy failed to deter an employer, the
employee qua insider would nevertheless be in the best position to
blow the whistle on a covert conspiracy before it could wreak major
competitive damage. 96 Finally, detection at any stage means that
section 4 would be serving its private enforcement purpose. Such
private enforcement is especially meaningful in the context of covert
horizontal conspiracies, which often require some supervision even
after detection and prosecution in order to prevent their
reappearance. 97
tain a § 4 action, his least costly alternative is to discharge the employee. This result eliminates
the deterrent effect of choices 2 and 3, both of which increase the costs involved in pursuing the
illegal activity.
Of course, because of the risk that an employee might help in a criminal prosecution, see
note 97 infra, the employer might still abandon the conspiracy. In this sense, the mere presence
of an uncooperative employee, regardless of his ability to sue, might deter the employer. Thus,
one could argue that permitting an employee to seek§ 4 recovery will not provide a unique
deterrent against employer wrongdoing.
At a minimum, however, allowance of standing would increase deterrence by reducing the
risks that an employee must contemplate before refusing to go along with an illegal scheme.
Because alternative remedies are limited, see note 82 supra, an employee will probably be
unable to recover damages if he is discharged for interfering with his employer's illegal activities. The financial risks involved might produce acquiescence in an employee who would
otherwise help to enforce the law. The availability of remedies gives the objecting employee
the security he needs to follow his conscience, and thus encourages greater public detection of
activities that violate the antitrust laws. See note 97 infra. In addition, awareness that employees have nothing to lose by enforcing the law would discourage employer initiation of illegal
activities.
96. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Avoiding
injury to the competitive structure itself is particularly important [because] once destroyed,
competitive conditions may be difficult to restore.") (citation omitted), vacated and remanded
mem., 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Case Note, supra note 16, at 197 ("Since conspiracies involving
price-fixing and allocation of customers have numerous victims, the number of resulting plaintiffs may well be decreased if the conspiracies are halted at an early stage through employee
suits..•. [T]he extent of harm will [also] be diminished."). Thus, despite judicial assertions
that discharged employees are not "efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws," Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 681 F.2d 514,520 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983), allowing such
plaintiffs to seek § 4 recovery would improve efficient enforcement of those laws by preempting
the worst anti-competitive effects of a given violation.
97. The detection rate of antitrust violations is admittedly much lower than that of other
crimes because antitrust violations are usually concealed and because " 'there is rarely an
identifiable victim who is aware of the violation.' " Berger & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 847
n.172 (quoting statement of former Assistant Attorney General Donald Baker before the Tenth
New England Antitrust Conference, Nov. 20, 1976) (emphasis added).
The history of the paper label industry serves as one example of the critical role of private
detection of antitrust violations. That industry has been the target of several price-fixing indictments beginning in the late 1930s and ending with civil and criminal antitrust actions filed
against nine paper label companies by the Department of Justice in March, 1974. H.S. Crocker
Co. was one of those nine companies. Eight executives of these companies, including Robert J.
Rodgers, president of H.S. Crocker Co., pleaded no contest to the criminal charges of price
fixing, and were fined and ordered to make speeches before public and business groups. A
year later one executive claimed, "Price-fixing in this industry can't ever be truly stopped. . . .
I'm not going to do it again, but I'm inclined to believe it will go on. I'm even betting it's going
on right now." Public 'sermons' by accused executives, Bus. WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 45. This
last government investigation of the paper label industry was triggered when a "disgruntled
former employee" tipped off a customer. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation,
86 YALE L. J. 590, 591 (1977). This disgruntled former employee was Frank J. Ostrofe, plain-
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CONCLUSION

In McCready, the Court appeared to instruct lower courts to recognize a more expansive section 4 cause of action unless some "articulable consideration of statutory policy" admonishes otherwise.
InAssociated General, the Court retreated a bit, enough to warn the
courts that they must not forget the common-law limitations on the
section 4 cause of action, and that they must not allow any one statutory policy consideration - particularly, the private antitrust enforcement goal of section 4 - to self-destruct under its own
complexity.
The Court's competing concerns can be harmonized in the employee discharge context. First, treble-damage recovery for the discharged employee is consistent with the pro-competitive thrust of the
antitrust laws. Second, conferring antitrust standing on the discharged employee furthers the compensation, deterrence, and private antitrust enforcement goals of section 4. No one of these goals is
sacrificed to another; and the private antitrust enforcement scheme is
not overburdened by speculative, impractical, or complex damages
claims. Third, common-law limitations do not limit standing where
the employee is the direct victim of the defendant's coercive scheme.
In short, the statutory policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of
judicial enforcement of the discharged employee's antitrust claim.

tiff in Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded mem.,

103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). He became the government's chief witness in their criminal investigation of price fixing in the paper label industry. Employees discharged for refusing to go along
with an anti-competitive scheme can therefore be quite important in enforcing the law; they
should not be denied the right to seek a remedy for the injuries they receive as a result of their
refusal to cooperate. See Case Note, supra note 16, at 191-92; note 95 supra. But see Malin,
supra note 82, at 278 ("[A]lthough the law should protect individual acts of whistleblowing
once they have occurred, it should not affirmatively encourage whistleblowing.").

